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WHO'S YOUR DADDY?: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF POST-MORTEM INSEMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
By 1980, Americans successfully used artificial insemination1 to con-
ceive 250,000 offspring.2 In 1987, according to the United States Con-
gressional Office of Technology's assessment, "more than 172,000 women
resorted to artificial insemination . . ., and about 65,000 babies that year
were born from this technique."3 With the advent and popularization of
alternative reproductive technologies, the legal system has encountered a
myriad of legal and ethical issues. For instance, are sperm and egg cells
property?4 If they are, who owns them?5 If an unknown donor provides
the sperm used in the artificial insemination, then who is the father?6
What rights and obligations do sperm donors have to the child?7 Do peo-
ple have a constitutional right to use reproductive technology to assist in
conception?8 If such a constitutional right exists, does the right extend
equally to married and single individuals?9 Does the constitutional right
to procreate encompass a right to determine paternity? Judicial determi-
nations as to the legitimacy of using reproductive technologies center on
the issue of whether the use of such technolgy falls within the purview of
1. "Artificial insemination" generally describes numerous methods of reproductive
technology, and is defined as: "[m]echanical injection of viable semen into the vagina."
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 147 (Clayton Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989).
2. WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN REPRO-
DUCTION 24 (1991).
3. Id.
4. See generally Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993)(discussing a deceased sperm donor's property interest in stored vials of sperm); Da-
vis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that, although "preembryos are not,
strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for human interest," individuals still pos-
sess an ownership interest in preembryos.) Id. at 597.
5. See generally Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283-85 (discussing the distribution of cry-
ogenically stored sperm samples); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
6. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT sec. 5, 9b U.L.A. 301 (1987) (discussing pa-
ternity determinations in cases of artificial insemination).
7. See People v. Sorenson, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1968); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821
(N.J. 1977); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
8. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 287-91.
9. Id.
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the constitutional right to procreate and to make procreative decisions.1"
The ability to store sperm, greatly enhanced by recent technology, adds
new complexities to the issues raised by artificial insemination. One such
complexity is the advent of the "posthumous child."'" A "posthumous
child" is conceived by using the stored sperm of a deceased father. The
process of storing sperm, called cryopreservation, consists of adding glyc-
erol to the sperm and then storing the sample at minus 328 degrees Fahr-
enheit. Cryo-preserved sperm samples, stored for as long as ten years,
have resulted in births of healthy children. 12 The ability to store, retrieve,
and use sperm years later presents women with the ability to conceive
after sterility, or even death of the sperm donor. The ability to generate
life with stored reproductive material presents moral and legal issues,
which center on whether public policy should allow for the non-coital
conception of a class of orphans,' 3 and whether a "posthumous child"
should enjoy inheritance rights, as well as rights to social security survivor
benefits of the deceased father.14 Illustrative of these issues is the situa-
tion where a "posthumous child" is entitled to inherit from the estate of
the deceased father. In such an instance, the finality of probate judg-
ments may be severely impaired.' 5 Furthermore, the extended period of
time during which a "posthumous child" may be conceived increases the
time in which the child may challenge the father's estate.
Such uncertainties may perplex administrators and result in anomolous
distributions. If the father attempts to provide for potential offspring, is-
sues may arise involving the construction of wills.' 6 As one commentator
wryly observed "[i]f such children turn out to be measuring lives, the
Rule against Perpetuities may apply in a manner that will put the case of
10. Id.; Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp.
1361 (N.D. 11. 1990); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); see Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting the right to privacy encompasses a right to make
procreative decisions).
11. For purposes of this Comment, the term "posthumous child" will refer to a child
resulting from the use of stored sperm to artificially inseminate and impregnate a woman
after the death of the sperm donor.
12. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law
of Post-mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1987).
13. Real parties in Hecht argued that the "'court should adopt a state policy against
posthumous conception,' because it is 'in truth, the creation of orphaned children by artifi-
cial means with state authorization ... ' Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. The Court of
Appeals rejected the real parties' policy argument. Id.
14. See id.
15. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 244-46.
16. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962).
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the Fertile Octogenarian to shame."17
This Comment focuses on the constitutional right to procreate and
make procreative decisions, and the applicability of that right to the prac-
tice of "post-mortem insemination.""a Section I discusses the history of
artificial insemination and of modern artificial insemination procedures.
Section II examines the constitutional right to procreate and the extent to
which it encompasses a right to use reproductive technologies to aid in
conception. Section III argues that the right to procreate does not en-
compass the right of a mother to have paternity judicially determined.
Section IV focuses upon the dearth of current statutory law concerning
the rights of "posthumous children," and how this abundance of statutory
law leaves the judiciary with little guidance to fairly arbitrate complex
issues and weigh competing interests. Further, Section V examines the
dynamic between the constitutional right to procreate and the current
statutes affecting the "posthumous child." Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that in the face of legislative inaction, courts must fill the chasm
within reproductive law, a job for which the courts are ill equipped.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
A. The History of Artificial Insemination
The concept of artificial insemination has provided topic for discussion
since 222 A.D., when a rabbi, interpreting the Talmud, contemplated the
hypothetical situation of a woman who unintentionally became impreg-
nated by semen residue in her bathwater. 19 The first documented inten-
tional artificial insemination occurred in 1322 when an Arab tribe
inseminated mares of an enemy tribe with semen from inferior stallions.2°
In 1770, an English doctor, John Hunter, recorded the first successful
human artificial insemination. 2' Dr. Hunter continued and furthered the
practice of artificial insemination through 1799.22
Seemingly averse to the concept of non-coital reproduction, the United
States did not readily accept the practice of artificial insemination. In
1866, Dr. Marion Simms recorded the first successful artificial insemina-
17. Id.
18. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 232-33; also referred to as "posthumous
parenting." Winthrop Thies, A Look to the Future: Property Rights and the Posthumously
Conceived Child, 110 TR. & EST. 992 (1971).
19. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 23.
20. Id.
21. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 12, at 234.
22. Id.
19971
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tion of a women in the United States.2" In that same year, the Italian
scientist Montegazza discovered the medical breakthrough that human
sperm could survive the freezing process.2 4 Thus, the philosophical dis-
cussion of the status of the "posthumous child" may have commenced as
far back as 130 years ago.
The viability of using stored sperm to create offspring increased after
the 1949 discovery that adding glycerol to sperm, prior to freezing, in-
creased sperm survival rates.25 Sperm storage gained increased accept-
ance in 1961 when the astronauts deposited sperm, prior to spaceflight, in
the event that radiation particles from space rendered them infertile.2 6
Later, soldiers participating in the Vietnam War stored sperm to ensure
their ability to become fathers.27 As illustrated by the increased activity
at sperm banks during the Gulf War, deposits at sperm banks increase
during military conflicts.2 8 Reasons for storing sperm also include possi-
ble sterility caused by chemotherapy, 29 expected suicide,3 ° and men un-
dergoing a vasectomy who wish to maintain the ability to procreate. 3 '
B. Current Practice of Cryopreservation and Artificial Insemination
Cryopreservation is the modern method for preserving sperm sam-
ples. 32 The process consists of mixing sperm with a small amount of glyc-
erol and preserving the samples in liquid nitrogen at minus 328 degrees
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Leach, supra note 16, at 943.
27. Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the Grave: An Analysis of Post-mortem Insemina-
tion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 525 (1993).
28. Id. at 526.
29. Alain Paraplaix stored sperm after warnings from his physician that chemotherapy
treatments, for his testicular cancer, could leave him sterile. Paraplaix c. CECOS T.G.I.
Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, Sept. 15, 1984, as reported in Shapiro & Sonnen-
blick supra note 12, at 229; Edward William Hart Jr. had stored his sperm under recom-
mendation from his physician while undergoing chemotherapy; Janet McConnaughey, Girl
Conceived After Dad's Death is Eligible for his Benefits, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 31,
1995, at A13.
30. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the
Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 993, 996 (1996).
32. Cryopreservation is the "[p]reservation of biological materials, such as tissue,
fluids, blood or plasma at very low temperatures. This enables the tissue to be used in
another individual at a later time, as it remains viable after thawing. The technique is used
to preserve human semen for artificial insemination." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 402 (15th ed. 1988).
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Fahrenheit (minus 196.5 degrees Centigrade).33 The American Associa-
tion of Tissue Banks ("AATB"), "composed of medical practitioners and
scientists with experience in cell, tissue, and organ banking,"34 establishes
codes and procedures for the preservation of biological material.35 How-
ever, the AATB does not have mandatory power over cryopreservation
banks, rather state regulations dominate this area.3 6 Therefore, the pro-
cedures required of a cryopreservation bank depend upon individual
state regulations. Yet, legislatures have not vigorously codified or investi-
gated the cryopreservation of sperm.37
Cryopreserved sperm, once thawed, have two-thirds the fertilizing ca-
pacity of fresh sperm.38 Therefore, numerous samples of sperm are
stored in the event that the initial insemination does not result in a fertil-
ized embryo.39 These numerous samples provide the possibility for multi-
ple inseminations.4 °
Three delineations of sperm types are used for insemination.4' The de-
lineations are based upon the status of the sperm donor and his relation-
ship to the female recipient.42 These three delineations are homologous
artificial insemination (AIH),4 3 combined artificial insemination (AIC),4 4
33. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.; See also Mika & Hurst supra note 31, at 993.
38. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
39. See Paraplaix, T.G.I., Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais, Sept. 15, 1984, as
reported in Shapiro & Sonneblick, supra note 12, at 229. See Freedman, supra note 2.
40. Fertilization will further depend upon the quality of the sperm sample as displayed
in the case of Corine Paraplaix where due to the poor quality of the sperm sample the
artificial insemination failed to produce a fertilized embryo, see infra discussion in text
Section II.C.
41. See generally LORI ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE
NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL IN-
SEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1984); See also TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 852 (15th ed. 1988).
42. ANDREWS, supra note 41, at 54.
43. Id. at 54. This form of artificial insemination is generally referred to as artificial
insemination by a husband, and involves using sperm donated by the husband to artificially
inseminate the wife. Id. For purposes of this Comment, AIH will include sperm donated
by a husband or paramour. Further, AIH will be used to describe those situations where it
is the intent of the donating party, and the recipient, that the donor be known as the father.
44. ANDREWS, supra note 41. AIC employs a mixture of the husband's and an un-
known donor's sperm, and typically is used when the husband has a low sperm count, or
the sperm has low motility. Id. See also TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 852
(15th ed. 1988). "[H]eterologous artificial. Artificial insemination in which the semen is
obtained from a donor other than the husband."
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and donor artificial insemination, or heterologous artificial insemination
(AID).45
Whichever type of insemination a female chooses, the physical act of
insemination is generally similar in most cases.46 During ovulation, a
physician uses a syringe to inject the sperm near the cervix.47 A compara-
ble method of artificial insemination inserts sperm into a cervical cap and
introduces the cap in the woman's vagina, where she wears it for the next
four to six days.48 Cases have been reported where women have artifi-
cially inseminated themselves using procedures roughly equivalent to
those described above.49
C. The Post-Mortem Insemination Case
Since the early 1980s, the use of stored sperm and the possibility of
"post-mortem insemination" have led to celebrated cases worldwide.5"
As displayed by the long history of artificial insemination, the technology
employed is not new.51 Nonetheless, legislatures have been slow to ad-
dress issues associated with non-coital reproduction, leaving the courts to
face challenges for which they are seemingly unprepared. Although arti-
ficial insemination may not be termed cutting edge, it is still more for-
ward looking than the courts. Conventional wisdom states that "[tihe
medical profession looks forward, while the legal profession gazes back-
ward."52 The common law system of stare decisis, adhered to by the
American judiciary, further exacerbates this situation.
In 1981, Alain Paraplaix stored a vial of sperm at the Centre d'Etude et
de Conservation du Sperm ("CECOS")53 prior to undergoing chemother-
apy, after his doctor warned that chemotherapy treatments could result in
sterility.54 Alain intended to store sperm, which could be used to father a
45. Id. at 5. The identity of the donor in these situations is unknown. Doctors often
use a mixture of several different donors in an attempt to make paternity determinations
more difficult, and thus protect the anonymity of the donors. Id. at 171. See also FREED-
MAN, supra note 2, at 33.
46. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 33.
47. ANDREWS, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1977).
50. See discussion infra Part III.C.
51. See discussion supra Part III.A.
52. Mika & Hurst, supra note 31, at 993.
53. A government sponsored sperm bank in Paris France. Shapiro & Sonneblick,
supra note 12, at 229 n.5.
54. Alain suffered testicular cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy in order to
treat the disease. Id.
Post-Mortem Insemination
child, if he in fact became sterile.55 At the time of the sperm deposit,
Alain lived with Corrine Richard.56 Alain and Corrine married in a hos-
pital ceremony, and Alain died two days later.57 Corrine Paraplaix peti-
tioned CECOS to release Alain's stored sperm to her.58 CECOS refused
to award custody of the sperm to Corrine arguing that it only had obliga-
tions to Alain, thus presenting the world with a case of first impression on
who had rights concerning the dispensation of a dead man's sperm.59 The
French courts decided in favor of Corrine, who was joined by Alain's
parents. 60 This case seems to symbolize the beginning of the "post-
mortem insemination era."61
An American counterpart to the Alain Paraplaix situation arose when
William E. Kane deposited fifteen sperm samples at the California Cry-
obank in October, 1991.62 Days later, at the age of forty-eight, he com-
mitted suicide in a Las Vegas hotel.63 At the time of the sperm deposit,
Mr. Kane lived with Deborah Hecht. 64 In his will, Mr. Kane provided, "I
bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of
my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to
Deborah Ellen Hecht. ' '65 Mr. Kane's children, from a prior marriage,
contested the dispensation of the vials of sperm to Ms. Hecht, arguing
that it was contrary to public policy to allow an unmarried women to
undergo artificial insemination. 66 Further, the children argued that pub-
lic policy forbade using a deceased man's sperm in artificial insemina-
tion.67 The California Court of Appeals for the Second District rejected
these arguments and ordered that the sperm be given to Ms. Hecht.
68
In 1990, Edward Hart, diagnosed with cancer of the esophagus, depos-
55. Id.
56. Id. at 230.
57. Id.
58. Shapiro & Sonneblick, supra note 12, at 230.
59. Id. at 229.
60. Id. at 233.
61. For purposes of this Comment "post-mortem insemination era" represents the
time frame since the Paraplaix case and refers to an era where the law has been surprised
by the increased popularity of post-mortem insemination and the resultant legal
challenges.
62. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
63. Id. at 277.
64. Kane had in fact lived with Hecht for approximately five years prior to the time of
his sperm deposits. Id.
65. Id. at 276.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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ited sperm in a New Orleans sperm bank.69 Mr. Hart wanted his stored
sperm to be used by his wife to create a child of his lineage, if chemother-
apy left him sterile.7°
Prior to his death in 1990, Edward Hart reminded his wife, Nancy, that
"[t]here could always be a child for you."'71 After his death, Nancy Hart
was artificially inseminated using the sperm of her deceased husband.72
Judith Christine Hart was born ten days prior to the one year anniversary
of her father's death.73 Nancy Hart petitioned the courts to have Judith
declared the daughter of Edward. She further petitioned the Social Se-
curity Administration for survivor's benefits, which Edward accrued, for
Christine. 74 The lawsuit was dismissed when the Social Security Adminis-
tration agreed to pay Edward's survivorship benefits to Christine.
Manny Maresca died in an auto accident, leaving behind a grieving
widow, Pam Maresca.76 Soon after Manny was pronounced dead, Pam
employed a doctor to harvest the sperm from Manny's body to store it for
her future use.77 If Pam Maresca conceives a child using Manny's sperm,
the legal issues presented by the Hart case may arise with respect to the
Marescas. The issues which arise in the "post-mortem insemination" con-
text may produce cases involving multiple individuals,78 or, because of
the nature of sperm banking, the legal issues may arise numerous times
involving the same individual.79
69. See Janet McConnaughy, Girl Conceived After Dad's Death is Eligible for His Ben-
efits, ORANGE CoUNrY REG., May 31, 1995, at A13. (describing the situation of the Harts'
in their attempt to have paternity established so that Christine would be eligible to receive
Social Security survivor benefits.). Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Hart v. Chater, Stipulation of Dismissal for Civil Action NO. 94-3944 sec.N magis-
trate 5 (E.D. La. March 18, 1996).
75. Id.
76. Marilyn Kalfus et al., High-Tech Fertility: Laws and Ethics Lag, ORANGE CoUNTY
REG., June 5, 1995.
77. Id.
78. As exemplified by the situations involving Corrinne Paraplaix, Deborah Hecht,
Nancy Hart, and Pam Maresca.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 38-49.
Post-Mortem Insemination
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FACING "POST-MORTEM INSEMINATION"
A. Constitutional Right to Procreate and to Make Procreative
Decisions
The constitutional right to procreate began ominously in the case of
Buck v. Bell.8" Carrie Buck was an eighteen year old institutionalized
female, termed "feeble-minded" by the United States Supreme Court. 8'
The question at issue was the constitutionality of a statute providing for
the sterilization of certain patients at the State Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded.82 The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Virginia that "Carrie Buck 'is the
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise af-
flicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her gen-
eral health and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by
her sterilization."'' 83
The Supreme Court reversed Buck v. Bell less than twenty years later
in Skinner v. Oklahoma.84 The statute in controversy, Oklahoma's Habit-
ual Criminal Sterilization Act, allowed for, at the determination of the
State Attorney General, the sterilization of a "habitual criminal."85 Jus-
tice Douglas began the majority opinion observing that, "Oklahoma de-
prives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a
race-the right to have offspring."86 The Court held the statute violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause87 due to "the ine-
qualities of the Act."88 The Court continued its investigation of the rights
infringed by the statute, stating: "[w]e are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man."89 The Court dis-
cussed the nature of an individual's right to procreate to emphasize that
80. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
81. Id. at 205.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
84. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
85. Id. at 536. The statute defined a habitual criminal:
as a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes "amounting
to felonies involving moral turpitude" either in an Oklahoma court or in a court
of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 541; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. "No State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
88. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
89. Id. at 541.
1997]
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"strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization
law is essential." 90
The Supreme Court dealt with the right to make procreative determi-
nations again in Griswold v. Connecticut.91 The Court held that a Con-
necticut statute, banning the. distribution of contraceptives to married
couples, violated a married couple's constitutional right to privacy. 92 The
Court observed that "[w]ithout [certain] peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure." 93 The Court found the specific right to pri-
vacy by holding "[t]he Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.,
94
The Court, therefore, established a privacy right to make procreative de-
cisions within marriage, while protecting the right to contraceptives with-
out government interference as a "peripheral right," which helped to
secure the specific right.95
Since Griswold96 only dealt with married couples' rights to privacy, sin-
gle individuals were not included as a group with rights to contraception.
Six years late, Eisenstadt v. Baird9 7 invalidated a state statute prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults.98
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmar-
ried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two indi-
viduals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.99
The Eisenstadt Court demonstrated the significance of the right to make
procreative decisions by holding that that right is so fundamental that it is
not reserved for a certain class of individuals, but rather resides within
90. Id.
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. Id. at 485.
93. Id. at 482-83.
94. Id. at 484.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 479.
97. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
98. Id. at 454-55 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 453.
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the constitutional protections available to all individuals. 100
Carey v. Population Services International'' further established the
specific rights of individuals to make procreative decisions.10 2 At issue
was a New York statute which made "it a crime (1) for any person to sell
or distribute any contraceptive of any kind to a minor under 16; (2) for
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to
persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to
advertise or display contraceptives.' °3 In declaring the statute unconsti-
tutional, the Court examined its prior decisions regarding the right to pri-
vacy, and summarized
[w]hile the outer limits of ... privacy have not been marked by
the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified government interference are per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage ... ; procreation... ; contra-
ception . . .; family relationships . . .; and child rearing and
education. The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child
is at the very heart of the cluster of constitutionally protected
choices. °4
The Court held "[w]here a decision ...to bear or beget a child is in-
volved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by com-
pelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those
interests."'0 5 New York failed to show a compelling state interest, and
the legislation was deemed unconstitutional. 0 6
The Court's description of the right to "beget or bear a child"'0 7 con-
templates that the right extends to the choice "to accomplish or to pre-
vent conception.' ' 08  The Court in Griswold, °9 Eisenstadt,"° and
100. Id.
101. Carey v. Populations Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
102. Id. at 678-79.
103. Id. at 678.
104. Id. at 684-85; See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54, 460, 463-65 (1972)
(contraception is constitutionally protected); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (mar-
riage and contraception are constitutionally protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (marriage and contraception are constitutionally protected); Prince v.
Massachusettes, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships are constitutionally pro-
tected); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation is constitutionally
protected); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and educa-
tion are constitutionally protected); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (child
rearing is constitutionally protected).
105. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
106. Id. at 678-79, 681-82, 684-86, 690.
107. Id. at 685.
108. Id.
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Carey"'. dealt with situations where technology was used to prevent the
conception of a child. The Court has not decided whether the privacy
protections afford individuals the right to use technology to conceive. In
light of the text from Carey, evidently, the right does extend to the use of
reproductive technologies. 1 12
B. Case Law Concerning the Use of Reproductive Technologies
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a case
involving the use of reproductive technology to conceive a child, lower
courts have confronted the issue. In Lifchez v. Hartigan,"3 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held an Illinois
statute unconstitutionally vague and violative of the right to privacy and
reproductive freedom. 1 4 The contested statute provided in pertinent
part:
(7) No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by
the fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm unless such
experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced.
Intentional violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the per-
formance of in vitro fertilization."15
The statute "impermissibly restricts a woman's fundamental right of pri-
vacy, in particular, her right to make reproductive choices free of govern-
mental interference with those choices., 1 1 6
The court pointed to embryo transfer and chronic villi sampling as pro-
cedures which potentially violate the Illinois statute. 1' 7 Embryo transfer
entails the removal of a fertilized embryo from a woman's uterus and
insertion of the embryo into an infertile woman enabling her "to have her
own child.""' 8 Such a procedure, the Court proclaimed, falls within the
scope of constitutional protections recognized by the Supreme Court.119
109. 381 U.S. at 479.
110. 405 U.S. at 438.
111. 431 U.S. at 678.
112. Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the Grave: An Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemina-
tion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 525 (1993).
113. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (1990).
114. Id.
115. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 38 para. 81-26, § 6(7) (1989); see also Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at
1361.
116. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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"It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitu-
tionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to contra-
ceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to
a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent,
pregnancy.,
121
In Johnson v. Calvert,121 a surrogacy case, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia discussed at length the rights of individuals to make procreative
choices. 122 The court gave credence to the use of reproductive technolo-
gies by declaring the gamete-providers 123 the natural parents of the re-
sulting child, rather than the surrogate mothers.'2 4 A contrary ruling
might inhibit the use of the reproductive technology because of the con-
flict between the rights of the gamete-material providers and the gesta-
tional mothers. If such a ruling had occurred, infertile couples could be
greatly dissuaded from using the reproductive method. This is likely be-
cause, in providing the genetic material, they did so only with the intent
that the surrogate carry the pregnancy to term, and that she not in any
way take on a maternal role. The monetary expense of the in vitro proce-
dure125 could dissuade individuals from using this reproductive method if
the gestational mother still has judicial preference. 126 Therefore, the
court's ruling extends the right of individuals to make, and act upon, pro-
creative decisions, by applying this right to the use of in vitro fertilization.
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of California continued
this trend in Hecht v. Superior Court.127 The case involved two issues: (1)
whether public policy proscribes the artificial insemination of an unmar-
ried woman, and (2) whether public policy forbids post-mortem insemina-
120. Id. at 1377.
121. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
122. Id.
123. "Gamete" is "[a] mature male or female reproductive cell; the spermarozoon or
ovum." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY 658 (15th ed. 1988).
124. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777.
125. The following definitions provide a vocabulary framework which is useful in un-
derstanding the use of reproductive technology. In vitro is defined as "[i]n glass, as in a
test tube. An in vitro test is one done in the laboratory, usually involving isolated tissue,
organ, or cell preparations." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 870 (15th ed.
1988); In vivo, is defined as: "[i]n the living body or organism. A test performed on a living
organism"; in utero defined as within the uterus. Id.; see generally ANDREWS, supra note
39 (discussing the spawning of the term, "test tube baby," where fertilization of an oyum
occurs in a labratory from in vitro insemination). Test tube baby is defined as "[a] baby
born to a mother whose ovum was removed, fertilized outside her body and then im-
planted in her uterus." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1712 (15th ed. 1988).
126. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785-87.
127. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
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128thcortion. Answering the first issue in the negative, the court rejected the
contention that it was "operating in a legal vacuum and free to establish
policies with respect to the access of an unmarried woman to a non-coital
reproductive technique (artificial insemination)., 129 The court deter-
mined that it was consistent with public policy to allow for the artificial
insemination of an unmarried woman, and that such an argument ignores
the demographics of modern society in favor of clinging to outmoded be-
liefs.130 In addition, the court decided that using a deceased man's sperm
for fertilization did not violate public policy, stating that "no other person
or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference with the gamete
providers' decision.., because no one else bears the consequences in the
way the gamete providers do.",131
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Davis v. Davis, implied that the
use of in vitro fertilization is protected under the right to procreate. 32
This case involved the dispensation of preembryos that were cryogeni-
cally stored.133 The Davises stored nine preembryos, and then they sepa-
rated. After their separation, each claimed rights to the preembryos. 3
The wife wanted possession of the preembryos for the purpose of using
them to induce pregnancy.' 35 The husband argued that he did not want
to be the genetic father, and that the use of his gamete material infringed
upon his constitutional rights.1 36 The court decided in favor of the ex-
husband noting that "[a] person's liberty to procreate or to avoid procrea-
tion is directly involved in most decisions involving preembryos. ,137 "It is
further evident that, however far the protection of procreative autonomy
extends, the existence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority
rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that their deci-
sions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status.' 38
128. Id. at 284.
129. Id. at 286.
130. Id. at 284-87.
131. Id. at 289.
132. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992).
133. Id. at 591-92.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 589.
137. Id. at 597.
138. Id. at 602.
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C. The Constitutional Right to Procreate Encompasses the Right of a
Woman to Use the Sperm of a Deceased Male for Artificial
Insemination
The combined holdings of Skinner,3 9 Griswold,'140 Eisenstadt,4' and
Carey1 42 establish a constitutional right of the individual to procreate and
to make procreative decisions. The additions of Lifchez,'4 3 Johnson,1 4 4
Hecht,145 and Davis1 46 establish the right to use reproductive technolo-
gies to induce conception.
Hecht147 squarely dealt with the disposition of cryogenically stored
sperm.' 4 The donor committed suicide and devised his interest in the
sperm to his girlfriend.' 49 The use of the sperm for post-mortem insemi-
nation was explicitly provided for in Mr. Hecht's will."' ° The court held
that the use of a deceased man's sperm was not against public policy. 5'
This case is the closest the courts have come to deciding upon the consti-
tutional protections afforded to "post-mortem insemination," and the re-
sult affirms the right of individuals to make use of the reproductive
procedure.
Looking to Griswold, the language of the Supreme Court supports the
contention that the right to procreate encompasses the right to use post-
mortem insemination.'5 2  Depriving individuals of the right to utilize
post-mortem insemination would make the specific right to procreate less
secure.' 53 The situation where a woman uses the sperm of a deceased
male is peculiar because it is the only method by which that woman may
bear the child of the deceased love.
The right to procreate does not limit that right to the ability to conceive
regardless of the genetic provider of the sperm. The right to choose who
will be the genetic father of one's child is intertwined with the decision to
139. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
140. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
141. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
142. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
143. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. I11. 1990).
144. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
145. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
146. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
147. 20 Cal. Rptr. 275.
148. Id. at 276.
149. Id. at 276-77.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 288-89.
152. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
153. Id. at 482-83.
1997]
202 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:187
procreate. 154 Without the ability to choose the genetic father, a woman is
forced either to forego her right to procreate, or to place her procreative
decision making into the hands of a third party. This restriction upon the
right to procreate impermissibly burdens the individual's constitutional
protections. Since the right infringed is recognized as a fundamental
right, any governmental intrusion must pass the strict scrutiny test, show-
ing both a compelling state interest and proving that the legislation is
narrowly tailored.155 Although the government may, in a specific case, be
able to show a compelling state interest in disallowing post-mortem in-
seminations, it is unlikely that a statute completely banning this proce-
dure would satisfy the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Therefore, the right to procreate encompasses the "peripheral right" '156 to
use the reproductive technology of post-mortem insemination.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE RIGHT
TO DETERMINE PATERNITY
The phenomenon of the "posthumous child" presents significant
problems for the law,157 specifically, who the father is, and what rights
and obligations the child can receive. As a preliminary matter, the consti-
tutional right to procreate does not include the right of a mother to have
a child declared the child of a deceased male. 158 In a typical "post-
154. See generally, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
155. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
156. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
157. See supra text accompany notes 1-17.
158. This area has been heavily regulated by statutes which limit the ability of individu-
als either to determine paternity or to place time limits or presumptions upon paternity.
See The Uniform Parentage Act which states:
Section 4 (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity or divorce, or after
a decree of separation is entered by a court;
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to
marry each other by a marriage is or could be declared invalid, and,
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the
child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its
termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce;
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is
born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation;
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or
attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemized in apparent compli-
ance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared inva-
lid, and
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mortem insemination" case, the donor was the husband or paramour of
the female.159 In such situations, the donor's intention is either explicit or
inferable from conduct.1 60 Therefore, where such intention is known, the
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity of the child in writing filed with the
[appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau].
(ii) with his consent he is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate, or
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or
by court order;
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child, or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the [appro-
priate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall promptly inform the
mother of the filing of acknowledgement, and she does not dispute the ac-
knowledgment within a reasonable time after being informed thereof, in a
writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau]. If, an-
other man is presumed under this section to be the child's father, acknowl-
edgment may be effected only with the written consent or after the
presumption has been rebutted.
(B) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate ac-
tion only by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions
arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts
is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.
The presumption is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of
the child by another man.
... Section 7 [a]n action to determine the existence of the father and child rela-
tionship as to a child who has no presumed father under Section 4 may not be
brought later than [three] years after the birth of the child, or later than [three]
years after the effective date of this Act, whichever is later. However, an action
brought by or on behalf of a child whose paternity has not been determined
[three] years after the child reaches the age of majority. Sections 6 and 7 do not
extend the time within which a right of inheritance or a right to a succession may
be asserted beyond the time provided by law relating to distribution and closing
of decedent's estates or to the determination of heirship, or otherwise.
9b U.L.A. 298-99, 306; but cf the statute contemplated in Michael H v. Gerald D, 491 U.S.
110 (1989), which demonstrates the existence and acceptance of statutes which highly regu-
late paternity determinations, that implicitly supports the concept no fundamental right to
determine paternity exists.
159. Alain Paraplaix stored his sperm while living with Corrine. Although, Alain never
explicitly made his intention known, it may be inferred from the hospital marriage that
Alain intended for Corrine to use the sperm and for the resulting child to be deemed his
child. Shapiro & Sonnenblick supra, note 12, at 239-52; William Kane lived with Debra
Hecht for the five years prior to his suicide. In his will, Mr. Kane made it explicit that he
stored his sperm in the event that Ms. Hecht wished to conceive a child fathered by him.
Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Edward Hart
stored his sperm because his doctor told him that chemotherapy might leave him sterile.
Prior to his death, he reminded his wife of the samples and stated "There could always be a
child for you." Janet McConnaughy, Girl Conceived After Dad's Death is Eligible for His
Benefits, ORANGE CouNTrY REQ., May 31, 1995, at A13.
160. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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mother may attempt to assert paternity when a statute prohibits the dec-
laration of paternity.' 6 '
The right to procreate protects those "peripheral rights" without which
the "specific rights" would be rendered meaningless. 162 However, the
right to determine paternity does not fit within this corridor. The appeal
of determining paternity, from the points of view of the mother and the
child, is that Supreme Court decisions mandate that legitimate and illegit-
imate children be accorded equal protection. 163 Children may inherit
from the estate of a deceased father, and may receive survivors benefits
accrued by the deceased from the Social Security Administration.
164
Thus, economically, a paternity determination may make a substantial
difference for a single mother, 6S or for a female contemplating post-
mortem insemination. Without benefits, which would be available upon a
determination of paternity, a potential recipient of post-mortem insemi-
nation may forego her right to procreate because of an inability to care
properly for a child. Regardless of how emotionally compelling this situ-
ation may seem, it does not justify the extension of the constitutional
right to procreate to include a right to a determination of paternity.
Although the right to procreate and to make procreative decisions is well
established, it neither includes the right to receive monetary contribu-
tions from the state, 66 nor to contest or share in the estate of the de-
ceased genetic father.
"In general, fatherhood is a status which is predominantely a function
of the family relationship.' 67 At common law, a child born to a married
woman was presumed to be the child of the husband.' 68 This viewpoint
still receives acceptance as indicated by statutes that presume a child born
161. Typical statutes limit the declaration of paternity to instances where the child was
conceived during the life of the sperm donor. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF As-
SISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4, 9b U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 1997).
162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
163. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) ("[state could not deny illegit-
imate child right to bring tort action for wrongful death of parent if it gave legitimate child
the same right]"); (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American
Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)).
164. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1991).
165. Generally when speaking of post-mortem insemination the woman is unmarried if
she is using the sperm of a deceased husband or deceased paramour.
166. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1991) (where the state contributions are recognized in the
form of social security survivors benefits).
167. John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.REv. 353, 372 (1991).
168. Id. at 372-73.
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within the sanctity of marriage is the husband's.16 9 In Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D.,17 0 the United States Supreme Court reinforced this view uphold-
ing a California statute which provided that the "presumption of
legitimacy may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in
limited circumstances., 171 The Court held that the law violated neither
the alleged biological father's procedural nor substantive due process
rights by refusing to allow him to establish his paternity of a child born to
the wife of another man.17 2
In the situation where a woman would like to have the paternity of a
child established in the context of post-mortem insemination, the sanctity
of marriage is not threatened as in the previous scenario.173 Though this
distinction may concern legislatures, it has no affect upon the constitu-
tionality of the right to determine paternity. In the absence of proper
statutory protections for posthumously conceived children, it is incum-
bent upon the judiciary to act to protect the rights of these children.
However, such protection should not become manifest through an exten-
sion of the right to procreate.
V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT STATUTORY LAW DEALING
WITH THE "PosTHUMOUS CHILD"
In a Social Security Administration news release, dated March 13,
1996, concerning the case of Judith Hart,174 Director Shirley S. Chater
175
stated:
[r]ecent advances in modern medical practice, particularly in the
field of reproductive medicine, necessitate a careful review of
current laws and regulations to ensure they are equitable in
awarding Social Security payments in cases such as this. This
review has begun. Resolving these significant policy issues
should involve the executive and legislative branches, rather
169. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 4(a)(1), 9b U.L.A. 298.
170. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. One of the justifications given for the California statute by the California Court of
Appeals, whose decision was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
was that it guarded against disrupting the sanctity of the marriage. Id. at 119-120.
174. This case involved Christine Hart, a child born one year and ten days after the
death of her genetic father Edward Hart. Judith Hart sought to have Christine declared
the legal heir of Edward in Louisiana and petitioned the Social Security Administration for
Survivor benefits for Christine. Hart v. Chater, CIVIL ACTION No. 94-3944 Section N
Magistrate 5 (1994).
175. Shirley S. Chater, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
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than the courts.1
76
The reproductive technologies referred to in the release are not new.
1 77
The release is correct in its assertion that the legislative and executive
branches should resolve these policy issues. By the same token, the ex-
clusion of the judicial branch in the face of inadequate measures insti-
tuted by the other branches is irresponsible.
Two uniform acts have been established that deal, in part, with the con-
sequences of reproductive technologies. 78 The first Act is the Uniform
Parentage Act ("UPA").'7 9 Section 5 of the UPA establishes guidelines
for a child of artificial insemination.18 0 However, the UPA completely
ignores the existence of the "posthumous child." Although the UPA is
regarded as forward looking in nature, it is woefully ineffective at protect-
ing the rights of the child born as a result of post-mortem insemination.
The UPA simply deals with the situation of AID 8' and ignores the po-
tential problems posed by post-mortem AIH.'82 Therefore, states that
have enacted legislation dealing with artificial insemination often inade-
quately deal with the "posthumous child."' 83 In the states that have
176. Statement of Shirley S. Chater, regarding the Status of Judith Hart case (March 13,
1996) (statements available at the Social Security Administration, Washington D.C.).
177. See discussion supra Section II.A.
178. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9b U.L.A. 301 (1987); UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acir § 4(b), 9b U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 1997).
179. 9b U.L.A. 287.
180. Id.
§5. [Artificial Insemination]
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him
and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of insemina-
tion, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of Health], where
it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure
to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records
pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a court
or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspec-
tion only upon an order of court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial in-
semination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Id.
181. See supra text Part II.B.
182. Id.
183. See Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-21 (1997). "All children born within wedlock or within
the usual period of gestation thereafter who have been conceived by means of artificial
insemination are irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both spouses have consented, in writ-
ing to the use and administration of artificial insemination." Id. Statutes, such as'the one
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adopted the UPA, the status of the posthumous child is unknown.184
The second act determining the status of children conceived through
reproductive technologies is the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act ("USCACA").' 85 Section 4(b) of this Act provides that
"[a]n individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a
child is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the indi-
vidual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.' 186
The USCACA is ineffective for two primary reasons. First, only two
states have adopted any part of the USCACA.187 Second, the USCACA
ignores the intentions of the genetic parents. When a sperm donor and
the sperm recipient intend for the donor to be known as the father of a
resulting child, the law should take notice of this intent. Instead, the US-
CACA legislates that the child, even when the intent of the genetic par-
ents is clear, remains fatherless.
Only seventeen states have adopted, in whole or in part, either one or
both of the acts dealing with children conceived through the use of repro-
ductive technologies. 188 Furthermore, fifteen of the seventeen state stat-
utes adopting the UPA 8 9 remain silent on the subject of the
enacted in Georgia, fail to provide adequate guidance for treatment of the "posthumous
child" because by definition the "posthumous child" is not "born within wedlock or within
the usual period of gestation thereafter." Id. These requirements preclude application of
such statutes to the posthumously conceived child.
184. States that have adopted the U.P.A. in whole or in part are Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.
9b U.L.A. 287.
185. 9b U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 1997)
186. Id.
187. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to
20-165 (Michie 1996).
188. ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1996); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7000 to 7018 (West
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to 19-6-129 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, §§ 801-
818 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1997); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 750, para.
40/1 to 40/3 (Smith-Hurd 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to 38-1129 (1995); MINN.
STAT. §§ 257.51 to 257.74 (1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135 (1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 126.001 to 126.39 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:18-59 (West 1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01 to
3111.10 (Anderson 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to 26.26.905 (West 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120
(1997). UNW. PARENTAGE Acr, 9b U.L.A. 287(1987).
189. ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1996); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7000 to 7018 (West
1997); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to 19-6-129 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, §§ 801-
818 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1997); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 750, para.
40/1 to 40/3 (Smith-Hurd 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to 38-1129 (1995); MINN.
STAT. §§ 257.51 to 257.74 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135 (1997); NEV.
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"posthumous child." Only two states explicitly refer to the "posthumous
child," and those statutes are inadequate because they give no deference
to the intentions of the genetic parents.1 90
Similarly, the ineffectiveness of legislation concerning the "posthumous
child" affects the Social Security Administration. "A dependent child of
a wage earner is entitled to 'child's insurance benefits' under the Social
Security Act if the wage earner is insured under the Act and dies, be-
comes disabled, or reaches the age of 65."'9' Under the Act, 92 entitle-
ment to benefits may be established by a number of methods, including:
a determination by the Social Security Administration that the
wage earner was the parent of the child and was living with or
contributing to the support of the child when the wage earner
REV. STAT. §§ 126.001 to 126.39 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:18-59 (West 1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01 to
3111.10 (Anderson 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to 26.26.905 (West 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120
(1997). UNIF. PARENTAGE Act, 9b U.L.A. 287 (1987).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 1996).
Parentage of Child resulting from Assisted Conception.-
A. Determination of parentage, generally.- Except as provided in subsections
B,C,D, and E of this section, the parentage of any child resulting from the
performance of assisted conception shall be determined as follows:
1. The gestational mother of a child is the child's mother.
2. The husband of the gestational mother of a child is the child's father,
notwithstanding any declaration of invalidity or annulment of the mar-
riage obtained after the performance of assisted conception, unless he
commences an action in which the mother and child are parties within
two years after he discovers or, in the exercise of due diligence, reason-
ably should have discovered the child's birth and in which it is deter-
mined that he did not consent to the performance of assisted conception.
3. A donor is not the parent of a child conceived through assisted
conception.
B. Death of spouse.- Any child resulting from the insemination of a wife's
ovum using her husband's sperm, with his consent, is the child of the husband
and wife notwithstanding that, during the ten-month period immediately
preceeding the birth, either party died.
However, any person who dies before in utero implantation of an embryo
resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete,
whether or not the other gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the
parent of any resulting child unless (i) implantation occurs before notice of
the death can reasonably be communicated to the physician performing the
procedure or (ii) the person consents to be a parent in writing executed
before the implantation.
Id.
cf N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991).
191. Haas v. Chater, 79 F.3d 559, 560 (1996).
192. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1991).
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died; or proof that the child was entitled to inherit from the
wage earner under the law of intestate succession of the wage
earner's state of domicile.193
This method of establishing entitlement is an option for the posthumous
child, but the entitlement to Social Security Administration survivor's
benefits is dependent upon state statutes governing inheritability. Since
most states inadequately deal with the posthumous child,' 94 the issue of
entitlement to benefits is in a state of confusion. Basing entitlement upon
state codes is arbitrary because the availability of benefits is based upon
the wage earner's domicile rather than on the merit of a specific case.
This may result in situations akin to forhm shopping. Thus, current legis-
lation affecting the posthumous child ineffectively deals with these
individuals.
The courts, therefore, are thrust into future shock without the proper
tools to fashion a solution. If the judiciary chooses to take the advice of
Director Chater,195 then it ignores the plight of the "posthumous child,"
as well as its role in the governing process. However, as noted earlier, a
statutorily mandated inability to establish paternity is not constitutionally
infected. Without a constitutional provision with which to support its de-
cisions, the courts will be forced to engage in judicial legislation. Statu-
tory interpretations will be the manner in which courts may contribute
most effectively to the legislative void. Until legislatures enact statutes
responsibly dealing with the children of post-mortem insemination, it is
the courts duty to act in a manner which may only be characterized as
judicial legislation.
193. Haas, 79 F.3d at 560. Additionally methods of proof include:
proof that the wage earner would have been married to the child's mother but for
a technical deficiency in the marriage; a written acknowledgment of paternity by
the wage earner, a judicial decree that the wage earner was the child's father,
provided the decree was issued before the wage earner died; a court order that
the wage earner contribute to the support of the child because the wage earner
was the child's parent; a determination by the Social Security Administration that
the wage earner was the parent of the child and was living with or contributing to
the support of the child when the wage earner died; or proof that the child was
intitled to inherit from the wage earner under the law of intestate succession of
the wage earner's state of domicile.
Id.
194. See discussion supra accompanying notes 178-90. These statutes ineffectively deal
with the "posthumous child" because they fail to consider the intentions of the gamete
providers in determining paternity. Rather, the statutes opt for blanket disavowance of
any paternity in the situation of post-mortem insemination.
195. See discussion supra accompanying note 175.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established both a right to
procreate and a right to make procreative decisions. Although the Court
has not ruled upon the constitutional protections afforded to the use of
reproductive technologies, lower courts have established a line of prece-
dent extending constitutional protections to cover the right to use repro-
ductive technology to induce conception. This constitutional right to the
use of reproductive technology encompasses the use of post-mortem in-
semination. However, the right to procreative decision making does not
encompass a right of the parents to have the "posthumous child" declared
the child of the male donor.
Current statutes are ineffective in dealing with the legal questions
which logically arise with the conception of the "posthumous child."
These statutes are ineffective because they either: (1) ignore situations of
post-mortem insemination, or (2) are not accepted by a significant
number of states. Consequently, courts enter the legal battle inade-
quately armed to deal with the issues which inevitably arise. The result
will either manifest itself in courts ignoring the plight of the "posthumous
child," or judges will invent ways to engage in judicial legislation.
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